Japan’s Ambition for Normal Statehood

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1. The Denial of Normal Statehood and the Embracing of Defeat

States in the international system have varying degrees of sovereign power, and sovereignty has many dimensions. The sovereign power of particular states can vary dramatically over time. Furthermore, many dispute the conventional Westphalian notion of sovereignty (Krasner, 1997). Kenneth Waltz defines sovereignty as the ability to retain autonomy over the fate of one’s state, and singles out the possession of strategic nuclear forces as a fundamental means to this end (Alker, Biersteker and Inoguchi, 1985). On this view there are only two normal states, the United States and to a lesser extent the Russian Federation. The European Union has deepened its authority to coordinate economic policy among member countries since January 2001. The result is that its member states have lost the sovereign power to issue currency and exercise exclusive management of their national economies. In this sense there is no normal state in the European Union. Not adhering to such narrow definitions of itself as the above two, I define normal statehood in a conventional Westphalian manner. In other words, I refer to a state’s basic authority and the extent to which it can exercise autonomy in the management of its economic and security affairs.

Normal statehood was denied to Japan in the period between 1945 and 1952 (Dower, 1997). It is common for regime change to occur after comprehensive military defeat (Russett/Stein 1972). Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers, led by the United States, to end World War II. The result was military occupation by the Allied Powers until Japan regained its formal independence in 1952. Since then, however, the United States has maintained a permanent military presence on Japanese territory under the auspices of the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Japan’s new Constitution, which was mostly drafted in 1946, abrogates the use of force in the settlement of disputes. The Security Treaty, drafted mostly in 1950, serves as a
linchpin which sustains Japan in war and diplomacy (Inoguchi, 2001). These initial institutional and spiritual constraints, established during the seven year period of occupation, mean that Japan has not possessed normal statehood for more than half a century. What I will do in the following pages is to examine Japan’s ambition for normal statehood as exhibited since the end of the Cold War. As the issue of normal statehood has been intermittently laid bare most clearly in Japan’s alliance with the United States, this chapter focuses on Japan-United States security alliance and Japan’s internal and external adjustments to its changing environments.

First, in order to be clear about the range of “normalcy” Japan aspires to achieve, I will present the three models of “normal” partnership with the United States that might be possible for Japan to have. Looking at British, German and French partnership with the United States and examining the key features of their partnership with the United States, namely, special relationship, regional embeddedness, and autonomy, respectively, I will illustrate some intricate subtle complexity of Japan’s yearning for normal statehood, which would be in congruence with its alliance with the United States.

Second, after specifying the range of normalcy to be examined in the preceding section, I will turn to three issues among those issues that have been brought up in Japan, in relation to normal statehood, namely, the role of force, the recurring salience of history, and the exercise of leadership. These three concepts need to be examined closely as they constitute parts of what are widely regarded as the conventional Westphalian conception of normal statehood. I will specify the relationship among the use of force, the recurrent salience of history and the lack of leadership exercise, all of which are discussed in the Japanese context of yearnings for normal statehood.

Third, I will give three recent events, the naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the free trade agreement initiative and the engagement with Pyongyang which illustrate how the three parameters of the use of force, the recurrent salience of history and the exercise of the leadership have been interwoven into Japan’s action and inaction as these three events unfolded.

Fourth, after all these examinations, I will reflect on the three parameters in the Japanese equation of normal statehood, with an eye at an emerging profile of Japan’s normal statehood and partnership with the United States under the “new” Pax Americana.

2. Three Models of Normalcy

It is likely that the Pax Americana will endure for some time to come, a la Pax Romana (Nye, 2002; Nau, 2002). As such, any discussion of the extent to which Japan can regain normal statehood must be located in the context of Japan’s relationship with the United States (Armitage, et al., 2000; Vogel, 2002; Ikenberry/Inoguchi, forthcoming). Here, alliance has arguably been replaced by partnership (Friedman, 2002). As Francis Fukuyama (1993) argues, fundamental differences in values and institutions have vanished since the end of the Cold War. In post-Cold
War global politics, trust has gained increasing salience. When trust is ascertained, then partnership can be created. Befittingly, the key theme of the World Economic Summit in Davos in 2003 was trust. When I refer to the US-Japan relationship the idea of a transition from alliance to partnership should be kept firmly in mind. I have come up with the following three models, which I hope will be of use in surveying and illustrating the range of “normal” partnerships with the US that it might be possible for Japan to consider reflecting on. I will look in turn at the following models: (1) British, (2) German, and (3) French.

2.1 The British Model

The key idea is that of a special relationship. Japan conceives itself as having special bilateral relations with the United States. Slightly more than a decade ago Ambassador Mike Mansfield characterized the US relationship with Japan as its “most important bilateral relationship—bar none”. This phrase was often deployed as the defining concept of Japan-United States relations during the 1990s. Britain also conceives of itself as having a special relationship with the US. In policy recommendations proposed by Richard Armitage the US-UK model was recommended as the best model on which to build future partnership between Japan and the US (Armitage et al, 2000).

Japan and the UK share some significant commonalities:

(1) They both conceive of themselves as distinctive and somewhat distant from their respective Continental neighbors;
(2) Both have high levels of economic interdependence with the United States and are embedded in the American pattern of economic relations;
(3) Both have significant alliance links with the US.

Since 9/11 the United States has drawn on the co-operation of a very wide-ranging number of partners from the anti-terrorist coalition, rather than on a few close allies noted by their special relationship with the US. It is true that the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Australia have been regarded as reliable allies by the United States on many occasions since September 21, 2001. Indeed, the United Kingdom and Australia are qualitatively distinguished from Japan, in that the former two can take military action without being subject to the same constraints as Japan. It sometimes seem as if the United Kingdom and Australia act like America’s mercenaries. This has provoked senior Japanese diplomats to remark that Japan is not as small as the UK (whose population size is one half of Japan’s), and does not feel it to be quite as necessary to fall into line so unquestioningly. As such, they are suggesting that the US-UK model might not be so
appropriate to the governing of US-Japan partnership. Japan was mentioned as a reliable ally a couple of times in the fall of 2001, but not after that. Rather, Japan has been lumped together with other members of the coalition against terrorism, in which other partners such as China and Russia loom much larger, a fact which Japan finds mildly disturbing.

Yet the prospect of American war with Iraq draws an ambivalent response from Japan. This is why Japan was mostly silent about the prospect of war with Iraq until Japan gave a speech at the United Nations after France and Germany took a very different position with regard to the postponement of the United Nations inspections in Iraq. Japan has made explicit its position more tightly aligned with the United States. There is of course an element of contradiction in Japan staying out of a war which is so clearly important to America, and yet still aspiring to be recognized as its most important bilateral partner. It is true that sending SDF forces into Iraq would arouse opposition at home. But sending state-of-the-art Aegis destroyers into the Indian Ocean, if not into the much closer Persian Gulf, is also argued by some to be both a prudent and gallant strategy for Japan to adopt. There is also a contradiction between the deftness and decisiveness of the initiatives taken on the Korean Peninsula and the indecisiveness and ambivalence demonstrated over the issue of potential war with Iraq. What is more, Japan acted on the North Korea issue after little consultation with the United States at the last moment. Presumably, North Korea wanted to extract concessions from Japan bilaterally while Japan wanted to create a diplomatic success domestically.

2.2 The German Model

The key idea here is regional embeddedness. Germany has been concealing itself within regional and international institutions such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adroitly aligning its national interests to broader regional and international interests. With its technocratic competence, rule-based steadiness and economic surplus deployed in pursuit of higher purposes, Germany has been quite successful in rehabilitating itself within a context where it does not regenerate old security concerns. This notwithstanding, Germany is also able to take initiatives which suit its own purposes within the broader context of European governance. This can be seen in the European Union’s eastern expansion and in the introduction of the single currency (Eberwein/Kaiser, 2001).

Japan and Germany share some significant commonalities:

(1) Their past experience as revisionist powers. In the words of Hans-Peter Schwartz(1985), Japan and Germany have progressed from Machtbesessenheit (self-aggrandizement before 1945) to Machtvergessenheit (an abstention from power politics after 1945). This
experience, combined with significant economic strength, renders both significant global
civilian powers (Maull, 1999);
(2) Their strong alliances with the United States, sustained by a substantial American military
presence;
(3) Their strong economic ties with and economic embrace of their respective regional
hinterlands.

Despite its firm economic embrace of Asia, at least until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japan
has not been characterized as being strongly embedded within the region. First, Japan’s traditional
approach has been to conceive of Japan as somehow external to Asia. Thus, “Japan and Asia” sits
well, just as “Britain and Europe” sits well (Inoguchi, 1996). Second, China, which does not
necessarily share basic norms and values with maritime East and Southeast Asia, has been on the
rise, both in terms of economic might and military power. If Japan is to embed itself with Asia,
Japan has to reshape itself with the much deeper linkage and alignment with China, a possibility
which Japan is not willing to take, given its predominant thinking with an emphasis on freedom,
democracy, human rights, free trade and the market economy and strong alliance with the United
States. Until 1997 Asia could be characterized as “in Japan’s embrace” (Hatch/Yamamura, 1995),
but since 1997 can more aptly be characterized as “lured by the China market” (Inoguchi, 2002),
although arguably still in Japan’s embrace. China’s offensive to lure foreign direct investment and
conclude a region-wide free trade agreement has intensified since its accession to the World Trade
Organization. Third, Japan’s way of handling its historical legacy has not always been to the
liking of other countries in the region. Japan’s adherence to the an American-certified
interpretation of its modern history has been solid, but has in recent times been partially diluted,
due to both the passing of time and the rise of nationalism. But Japanese nationalism should not
be exaggerated. Japanese are much less likely than other Asians to conceive of national identity as
their primary source of identity. 96-98% of South Koreans and Thais depict national identity as
their primary source of identity, but only 60% of Japanese do the same (Inoguchi, 2002).

In the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Japan and Germany, like most others, did
their best to support the United States, by disregarding precedents, bending interpretations and
sending military personnel to the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan respectively. With the prospect of
an American war with Iraq increasing, Gerhard Schroeder proclaimed that Germany would not
participate. On September 17, 2002, Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea, one of the members
of the “axis of evil”, and concluded a communiqué with Kim Jong Il. In this communiqué Japan
acknowledged historical issues and pledged to extend compensation once diplomatic
normalization is complete, while North Korea undertook to demonstrate its peaceful intentions,
declaring that it would not seek to develop and maintain missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. (One month later, Kim Jong Il admitted to James Kelley, Under Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, that North Korea had been developing nuclear weapons until recently, which is quite contrary to what Kim Jong Il said to Junichiro Koizumi.) Depending on your view, the actions of Schroeder and Koizumi could be interpreted in two ways. They could be interpreted as constructive attempts to reduce tension and facilitate peaceful accommodation with axis of evil countries, or as maverick self-interested acts which undermine the focus and integrity of America’s policy of seeking disarmament, and ultimately regime change, in axis of evil countries.

One should also bear in mind the fact that the greater a state’s regional embeddedness, the less straightforward its process of preference ordering. This is especially so when domestic anti-militarism norms are so strong, and especially in countries where the legacy of war has played such a pervasive role in the construction of contemporary national identity. The US is concerned that if Germany and Japan become more regionally embedded, this will push their foreign policy preference-ordering still further out of kilter with American concerns. Schroeder’s flat refusal, during the election campaign, to participate in the war on Iraq, and Koizumi’s blitz summit diplomacy in Pyongyang were both in broad disharmony with the evolving American campaign against the axis of evil (Iraq, North Korea, and Iran). The United States ascribes differing degrees of significance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Japan-United States Security Treaty. After 9/11, the United States finds Europe decreasingly problematic. Its policy towards Europe has become more benign, if only because of the lack of threat from Russia and from its strategic nuclear forces. Instead the United States finds the Middle East and East Asia much more problematic and volatile, with each region having the potential to destabilize the peace and stability of the entire world. Here lies the qualitative difference in anti-U.S. or pro-U.S. policies that Germany and Japan can take. It has a lot to do with the difference between Europe’s and East Asia’s strategic importance to the United States. On this view Japan has less latitude to adopt anti-U.S. policy than Germany, because of the greater contemporary significance for peace and security of the East Asian region.

2.3 The French Model

The key idea here is that of autonomy. Japan is a close ally and partner of the US. But this alliance has its roots in an ultimatum, an all out war, complete disarmament, occupation, and regime change. Given Japan’s economic performance since the Second World War it is only natural that it should seek more autonomy. France has recently asserted itself against the US, even if only in a practical way. It has accomplished this through Jacques Chirac’s deft and adroit maneuvering in the debates surrounding the passing of UN Security Council Resolutions permitting the use of force against Iraq. This French self-assertion is something Japan is quietly envious of, but very apprehensive about its self destructive nature of helping to divide Europe, to
make the United Nations less effective, and to enhance the influence of the United States (Kealer/Schain, 1996).

Japan and France share some significant commonalities:

1. Both are close allies of the United States;
2. Both have a strong interest in peaceful and prosperous regional relations. Japan is sandwiched by China and the United States, as is France, by the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and by Germany and Russia on the other;
3. Both seek to cultivate a diverse range of diplomatic partners from outside their immediate spheres of activity, using such concepts as comprehensive security and the Francophone group respectively.

Gaullism is attractive to Japan as it essentially boils down to an assertion of autonomy. Through its tight alignment with the United States, Japan has placed all of its diplomatic eggs in one basket. This excessive alignment has generated a significant body of dissenting argument suggesting that Japan should strive for greater autonomy. Akira Morita and Shintaro Ishihara famously published a book to this effect, entitled The Japan That Can Say No. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in a speech in Washington D.C., suggested that converting all the Japanese-owned US government bonds back to Japanese yen might lead Americans to think again about taking Japan for granted. Eisuke Sakakibara, Vice Minister for International Affairs at the Ministry of Finance, was openly defiant when his idea of setting up an Asian Monetary Fund in the wake of the Asian financial crisis was flatly rebuffed by his American counterpart, Lawrence Summers. Summers wryly noted that he thought wrongly that Sakakibara was a true friend. When this author interviewed him in 1997, his office was dominated by a picture of a militant Islamic Mujahedeen fighter brandishing a sword. The alleged beauty of the French model is that, in the words of Jacques Chirac, France is a true friend, in the sense that true friends will often give you advice that you do not want to hear, before ultimately offering you their support. He also noted that sycophants will not do this, alluding perhaps to Tony Blair’s United Kingdom.

The problem with the French model is that the Japanese leadership style is poles apart from the French. Japanese elites have not produced a Jacques Delor, a Pascal Lamy, a Jacques Attali, or a Francois Giscard D’Estaing. These men all exercise a strong leadership role in an articulate, confident and adroit fashion. The Japanese political system, as an essentially decentralized consensus-oriented system, tends either not to create, or perhaps more importantly not to reward, such a leadership style at the highest level (Inoguchi, 2002a). Potential Japanese Gaullists endure great frustration as a result. However, Koizumi’s articulate message and decisive
response in support of the war against terrorism, and his dramatic Pyongyang summit are not inconsistent with the French model of leadership and a French preparedness to pursue initiatives which might upset the US.

Viewed from the United States, France and Japan are different, and as such should not be expected to attempt to achieve similar levels of autonomy from the US. The key intermediary variable is the perceived value to the United States of the roles they both play in their respective regions. France is critical to the aggregation of unity and stability in Europe, with the United Kingdom psychologically semi-detached from the Continent, and Germany hampered by the institutional and historical constraints placed on its foreign policy initiatives, especially in the absence of a countervailing Soviet threat. France is perceived to be sufficiently critical to unity and stability in Europe that the US is prepared to grant it considerable autonomy in its diplomatic affairs. One might argue that French Gaullist policy seeking the autonomy of not only France but also a greater Europe stretching to Estonia and Cyprus collide with the interest of the United States, of the NATO and to a lesser extent of Germany in Central Eastern Europe, the Baltic, the Balkans and the East Mediterranean.

Japan’s role in East Asia is very different. Other than Japan, there is no country that the United States can count on as a key stabilizing power. China does not share core values and norms with the United States and the other leading, largely Western, liberal democracies who manage the international system. Korea is too small for the United States to count on. ASEAN is not only too small but also too fragmented and vulnerable. Hence the degree of autonomy the United States can afford to give to Japan is measurably smaller.

3. Japan’s return to normal statehood?: Three Possible Indicators
I now examine closely three events which suggest that Japan is moving toward normal statehood at the beginning of the twenty-first century: (1) Japan’s naval operations in the Indian Ocean; (2) Japan’s free trade agreement initiative; and (3) Japan’s engagement with Pyongyang.

3.1. Naval Operations in the Indian Ocean
The events of September 11, 2001 were of course a shocking surprise for Japan as well as the United States and all other civilized countries. Both the public and lawmakers in Japan gave emphatic support to President George W. Bush as he announced a war on terrorism. As le Monde editorialized at the time, “Nous sommes tous Americains”. Flowers were laid high in front of the United States Embassy in Tokyo to commemorate those killed in the attacks. Ambassador Howard Baker expressed his heartfelt gratitude to the people and the government of Japan for recognizing and sharing the deep sorrow and anguish of Americans.
The Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, took swift and effective action and dispatched warships to the Indian Ocean to “show the flag” of Japan in the joint anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan in 2001. Japan’s self-assigned tasks there were primarily to fuel the bomber aircraft of the United States and the United Kingdom. By not placing warships directly in combat zones for combat purposes, which is forbidden by law, the Japanese government was able to make a contribution without arousing substantial opposition in the National Diet, as well as among the public. The Japanese government’s obsession in the aftermath of September 11 was an avoidance of Japan’s perceived failure in the Gulf War of 1991. Then, the Japanese government contributed an enormous amount of money to the war effort, without its role being significantly acknowledged in the relevant official statement by the United States government (Inoguchi 1992).

This time Japan was hailed in one of the State Department statements as one of America’s most valuable and trustworthy allies, along with the United Kingdom and Australia. It must be noted, however, that one of the statements by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the Afghanistan campaign did fail to mention Japan as war allies. Only after the State Department’s intervention in the announcing of the statement did the chairman mention Japan. Aside from the Japanese government’s obsession about the Gulf War “mistake”, Japan’s action represented “two steps forward” in attaining normal statehood; Japan’s Navy played a vital role in the Indian Ocean.

At the same time, “one step backward” can be detected in the final decision. At the highest level of decision-making, lawmakers, represented by former secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party Hiromu Nonaka, a staunch anti-militarist, opposed the deployment of Aegis-equipped warships which could detect and prevent missile attacks from ten sources simultaneously. These are state of the art weapons with which the United States, Japan and Spain are equipped. Instead, AWACS-equipped warships were deployed, whose major roles are submarine detection and the fuelling of bomber aircraft. This notwithstanding, Japan’s naval operations in the Indian Ocean marked a significant departure from the past. In Cambodia in 1991-1992 some 250 Self-Defense Force troops were sent for peace keeping operations (Ikeda, 1994). In the Gulf War of 1991 the Self-Defense Forces were sent to conduct post-combat mine-sweeping operations. In East Timor since 1999 some 750 Self-Defense Force troops were sent for peace keeping and building operations. They are of course positive developments, but they do not come close to the Rubicon of engagement in military combat. In the war on terrorism the Self-Defense Forces flirted with this Rubicon.

Another noteworthy feature of Japan’s response is the fact that opposition to Japan’s naval operations was minimal, both at home and abroad. Ten years before, during the Gulf War, vehement opposition to Japan’s potential military involvement was
expressed in the National Diet. This opposition killed the government’s move to send the Self Defense Forces into the Persian Gulf during that war stone dead. But in 2001 domestic opposition was minimal. The response of Japan’s neighbors to its despatch of SDF forces was also mild. Normally South Korea and China vehemently oppose any kind of security-related activity by Japan. But this was not the case with regard to the war on terror. South Korea has been forging close ties with Japan and shares an anti-terrorist commitment with both Japan and the United States. China also has radical Muslim dissidents who have been prepared to use violent methods of destabilization. Curiously enough, the Chinese media played down the reporting of 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, the Taliban was phonetically translated into Chinese, Ta-li-ban, rather than shenxueshi, students of theology, the direct translation from Arabic. The latter might give readers the impression that the Taliban is some respectable entity. The Taiwanese media use shenxueshi. There are also Falung Gong adherents, democracy activists, and a massive number of city-ward immigrants without a solid job and home, all of whom can be governed under the auspices of a tough solidarist stance on terrorism. China also has every reason to cultivate and maintain stable and friendly relations with Japan; the maintenance of a peaceful international environment is necessary as the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party strives to develop China into a powerful and wealthy country (Shambaugh and Yang, 2002).

Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution has been de facto modified a number of times to suit the needs of Japan, through governmental reinterpretation during deliberations in the National Diet. There is another factor that could potentially contribute to the accelerated restoration of Japan’s normal statehood. Major wars among states have been in steady decline (Mueller, 1982). Thus the significance of conventional alliance politics seems to have been significantly reduced. Also, after 9/11 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been de facto replaced by a new military alliance, NASTY (Nations Allied to Stop Tyrants), of which the U.S., the U.K., and Australia are core members (Friedman, 2002, 11/17). The likelihood of those nations less inclined to use force for international disputes or humanitarian interventions to be associated with the normal state in the conventional Westphalian sense will decline in tandem with the overall decline in the incidences of the use of force in the world because the Westphalian abnormality will become perfectly normal. Finally, as a global civilian power (Maull, 1992), Japan has a legitimate role to play in places such as the Indian Ocean, East Timor and Afghanistan.

3.2 Japan’s free trade agreement initiative

Japan can be regarded as a champion of free trade for those who undertake it on a
voluntary basis. This has been the spirit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (Garnaut/Drysdale, 1994). It can be characterized as open, loose regionalism. No obligatory trade and market liberalization targets are imposed on member countries. As the newly industrializing countries of the Asia-Pacific attempt to learn from the theory and practice of the developmental state, as exemplified by Japan in the third quarter of the 20th century (Johnson 1983; Woo-Cumings, 1997), it is perhaps natural to pursue the notion of open loose regionalism. They are Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states. The aggregation of domestic sectoral interests and diplomatic deftness and dexterity are a lot to do with the exercise of leadership at the high level of the Japanese polity, a highly decentralized country. Since they are arguably the problem of internal power structures, one might as well not relate them to the issue of the normal statehood. But as long as the Japanese debate goes with respect to normal statehood, these issues are directly or indirectly related to the issues of normal statehood. Those emphatically arguing for Japan attaining normal statehood point to the two major factors (1) that Japan has been so accustomed to its free ride and dependence on the United States for its security and free market and (2) that Japan has attained so high a level of material wealth and been addicted to the post materialistic life of individualism, laissez-faire, and weak national identity and patriotism.

But financial market globalization has deepened, and regional economic integration has emerged as the most appropriate way to absorb the impact of globalization on regional economies. It was natural for countries to seek free trade agreements within the Asia-Pacific regional economy. Furthermore, there has been a substantial increase in foreign direct investment in China, which has also proved itself able to competitively export manufactured goods. This has alarmed other Asia-Pacific countries and caused them to seek free trade agreements within the region. China’s increased ability to attract foreign direct investment and competitively export manufactured goods means that unless regional free trade agreements can be concluded, other economies in the region will have their competitiveness reduced. The scramble for regional free trade agreements can be seen as an attempt to achieve two objectives: (1) to absorb the forces of globalization, especially the negative implications of the rise of China and (2) consolidate economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other regions.

Japan’s desire for free trade agreements has intensified as its own economic surplus has visibly shrunk. This is due to structural rigidities within Japan, and the fact that China has absorbed so much foreign direct investment, both within the region and from Japan itself. Japan’s initial procrastination in undertaking regional free trade agreement initiatives led China to beat it to the punch, in the form of a China-ASEAN free trade agreement. Japan can be slow to pursue its free trade agenda. At home Japan is unable to swiftly aggregate various sectors’ tariffs and non-tariff barriers into a package of positions on each product. Abroad, it is unable to deftly
aggregate various countries’ preferences into a regional package. By contrast, as stated, in 2002 China was able to conclude such an agreement with ASEAN, although needless to say, it’s implementation needs some more years.

Concluding a regional free trade agreement requires two important attributes that are conventionally associated with the possession of normal statehood: (1) authority to claim domestic sovereignty over variegated domestic interests; (2) diplomatic deftness and dexterity to attract would-be members, come to grips with their various needs and aggregate them harmoniously into a package. The problem is that the Japanese political system is decentralized, with local chieftains invariably acting as “kings of small things”. These kings often effectively exercise a veto, by using the culturally acceptable excuse of forming and consolidating consensus (Inoguchi, 1993). This façade of consensus and unity defies reality, which is revealed most glaringly at times when nation-level packages must be formulated, such as when there is the prospect of a fruitful regional free trade agreement. Japan’s first bilateral free trade agreement was concluded with Singapore, principally because Singapore does not have a significant agricultural sector. This meant that it was not necessary for sectoral interests in Japanese agriculture to veto the free trade agreement. Normally the conclusion of such an agreement would entail some compromise with Japan’s uncompetitive agricultural sector. A free trade agreement with Korea has been talked about far more than a decade to no avail. More recently, an agreement has been put forward that instead of a Japan-ASEAN free trade agreement, bilateral free trade agreements should be brokered, such as the bilateral free trade agreement between Japan and Thailand. Sectoral protectionism within the Japanese polity has made Japan a very weak actor in the regional free trade game.

Second, diplomatic deftness and dexterity are not regarded as something with which Japanese are amply equipped. Designing a package which could accommodate the needs of the 15 plus members of ASEAN is indeed a daunting task. That is why some want to proceed in more piecemeal fashion through bilateral free trade agreements. More fundamentally, Japan’s utmost priority does not seem to be trade liberalization but developmental facilitation and sectoral protection (Asahi Shimbun, October 19, 2002). In the 1998 APEC negotiations there was a clash between Japan and the United States over the U.S.-initiated early voluntary sector-specific liberalization (EVSL) scheme, through which the U.S. wanted to accelerate trade liberalization in fisheries and forestry. The United States regarded its initiative as in harmony with the APEC spirit of respecting member countries’ initiatives, but Japan vetoed it. On the U.S. view, Japanese priorities are less with trade liberalization than with developmental facilitation and enhancement of regional ties, along with sectoral protection. Japan’s decentralized authority structure also undermines its diplomatic deftness. The Japanese political system has been far more decentralized and fragmented than one would imagine in view of the centralizing tendencies of
the Meiji-government and the war-mobilization operations of the early Showa government (Inoguchi, 2002a). Globalization can diversify consumer preferences, but also those of electorates and sections of the government. Isolated acts of diplomatic deftness are possible, as can be seen from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s dramatic summit with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang on Sept 17, 2002. But if the authority structure remains so decentralized, political leadership will be difficult to sustain. Needless to say, those agencies which are not constrained by sectoral protectionism have started to use the World Trade Organization to undermine sectoral protectionism more consciously than before.

3.3 Engaging Pyongyang

Normal statehood can be resumed when the collective “past” is settled and when collective “identity” is constructed. The history issue is part of the “abnormal” state of limited sovereignty. “Standing tall” in the commonwealth of nations has been more or less prevented to Japan because of its history. History comes into play, in the sense that all countries are heavily influenced, and some even haunted by their pasts. The United States, standing tall after the anti-terrorist war, is arguably still haunted by Vietnam. Leading figures in the Bush Administration have drawn lessons from Vietnam and from Hitler. When Hitler was on the rise, the West did not confront him, or act in time to thwart the early development of his project of annexation and annihilation. When Vietnam became a major problem, the United States government was prevented from completing its military and nation-building project to its satisfaction, by enemies within. But now that the United States is the only superpower, and does not appear to face any genuine immediate challenge to its hegemony, the US is able to attempt to mold the world to its taste, and has adopted a new unilateralist and preemptive doctrine to this end.

Nevertheless, historical issues continue to prevent Japan from attaining normal statehood. Japan’s modern history has been haunted by the legacy of the fact that it was the only non-Western nation to achieve modernization and achieve a rank on a par with Western powers by World War I. On the one hand, Japan wanted to achieve wealth and strength by learning from the West. On the other, Japan wanted to free itself from Western domination, and place itself at the center of the rise of a powerful Asia. Japan did not appreciate the motives of Western powers in developing multilateral schemes for conflict prevention, confidence building and arms control after World War I (Iriye 1962 and 2002). All these schemes were simply regarded as new cloaks for the perpetuation of western dominance. Therefore, Japan continued to extend its influence over proximate territories, even in the face of protests and warnings. This process culminated in the imposition of sanctions, and all-out war in 1941. By 1945 Japan was bombed to ashes.

A majority of Japanese regard the events of the 1930s and 1940s as an aberration, a
detour from the appropriate course of enlightenment and entrepreneurship which has enabled Japan to achieve its status as a rich country with a strong army (Inoguchi, 2002b). The Allied Powers, led by the United States, reformed Japan’s political structures during the occupation, 1945-1952, attempting to shape its history according to a western view of acceptable standards. Americans initially wanted to deny Japan’s history in much the same way that Germany wanted to deny its own immediately after defeat. In the German version, all modern German history led to the Third Reich and an entirely new German history started in 1945. In contrast Americans came to adopt a milder and more benign interpretation of modern Japanese history. It was conducive to the emerging demands of the Cold War world that Japan was conceived as an ally which had suffered an aberration (Reischauer/Fairbank, 1973). The Japanese leadership welcome it as it suited their preference of retaining the Emperor as the symbol of Japan, the preference that has kept the history issue more difficult to deal with till today. Japan initially largely avoided these issues by not treating any 20th century history in history textbooks. The outcome has been that the Japanese settlement of history has been placed vaguely in limbo since 1945.

Nevertheless, some aspects of the historical legacy have been addressed, in the diplomatic sphere at least. Diplomatic normalization took place with the Republic of Korea in 1965, with the People’s Republic of China in 1972 (Fukui, 1975) and with the Soviet Union in 1957, albeit without the formal conclusion of a Peace Treaty (Hellman, 1970). As of December 2002, the only country which has not embarked on diplomatic normalization is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The problem is that the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty of 1965 covers the entire territory, including that of North Korea. Japan regards the ROK as the sole legitimate state entity on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea accuses Japan of colonialism, suppression, and exploitation during the colonial period and thereafter. North Korea regards Japan as serving the interests of the United States in keeping the Korean Peninsula divided and by posing military and economic threats. North Korea demands that on the eve of diplomatic normalization, Japan needs to acknowledge the wrongs of the past and to promise to pay a massive amount of compensation, which would be invested in economic recovery and development in North Korea.

Historical issues are not easy to resolve because they relate so fundamentally to questions of Japanese identity. Japan’s sense of historical affiliation with Asia is weak. “Japan and Asia” sits more comfortably than “Japan in Asia” among Japanese (Inoguchi, 1995). However, with the passage of time the history issue will become less significant. When Secretary General Hu Yaobang of the Chinese Communist Party was asked when China might forgive Japan for its aggression and atrocities, he answered that it would take 85 years after the war. After all, he said, Chinese had now forgotten the Boxer intervention of 1900-01. Further, with the steady intensification of binding regional ties, historical issues will assume less relative significance.
4. The Issue of Normal Statehood

4.1 The Exercise of Leadership

By authority structure I refer to the way in which decisions are made and how they are implemented. In the past half a century Japan’s authority structure has often been characterized as a system of decentralized consensus formation. The power structure is decentralized, preference aggregation through consensus formation is a lengthy process, and yet the decisions that are eventually implemented tend to be solid. This decentralized consensus based authority structure has its origins in Japanese history. Firstly, the fact that Japan did not experience absolutism in its early modern period meant that the structure of a fairly decentralized system was already established by the 17th century (Ikegami, 1993; Inoguchi, 2002a). There were of course influential centralizing aspects to the governance practiced through the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The Tokugawa system of ceding quasi-autonomy to 300 odd domains was replaced by the Meiji system, under which quasi-autonomy was ceded to 20-odd agencies at the center of government. The Imperial Constitution of 1890 placed the Emperor at the apex of the state. But the essentially decentralized system of decision-making remained intact. Cabinet ministers representing each bureaucratic agency, including the Army and the Navy, had veto power vis-à-vis the Prime Minister, for instance. The 1952 Constitution (drafted largely in 1946) was refreshingly progressive in areas such as gender equality, freedom, and social policy. It reflected the ideas of the Democratic grand coalition of the 1930s which remained influential in the United States at that time. But the authority structure as prescribed in the new Constitution is not much different from that contained in its predecessor. There were of course some differences: the Emperor lost his political statute and influence, the Army and the Navy were abolished, the Ministry of Home Affairs was disbanded and reconstructed into a several smaller agencies, and the Prime Minister was given slightly more power than in the Imperial Constitution.

Secondly, the waning of the developmental state in Japan, which was designed to coordinate the mobilization of resources during the initial period of industrial take-off, has also contributed to the recent decentralization of decision-making (Johnson 1983; Woo-Cumings, 1997; Schaede/Grimes, 2003; Inoguchi, forthcoming). This decentralization took place in the 1980s and 1990s when the United States wanted immediate and tangible concessions from Japan to help it address the economic difficulties which it was then experiencing. It seemed to many Americans as if either nobody was in charge of Japanese decision-making, or that there were too many leaders, each with a veto. This was a source of great exasperation to U.S. negotiators who wanted deals and decisions made on the spot, and imagined that these could be obtained by dealing directly with people at the highest level (Blaker et al, 2002). To their great dismay, the Japanese authority structure, especially in the twilight of developmental momentum, did not and does not seem to produce leaders in the American sense of the word.
The third explanation for Japan’s decentralized decision-making structure is related to the second. Globalization has steadily permeated Japanese society, despite Japan’s facade as a hierarchically bureaucratized structured society, and despite Japan’s hitherto predominantly domestic market orientation. It is true that in the past Japan has been internally comfortable and well-integrated. This was achieved through social policy tailored to alleviate the plight of the disadvantaged, and cartelized arrangements among sectors and between management and unions. But a society which was once well-integrated is fragmenting, as is an economy which in the past was predominantly oriented to the domestic market, except for a tiny portion of competitive firms and sectors which contributed to the accumulation of foreign reserves.

As Renato Ruggeiro, former director of the World Trade Organization, says, it is more difficult to govern an integrated world than a divided one. Consumption patterns diversify as global markets integrate. Previously unitary national markets fragment in the face of the intensification of globalization and the diversification of choice. There is no compelling reason to imagine that Japan will prove to be an exception to this rule. Indeed, the fragmentary implications of globalization have reinforced the centripetal nature of the Japanese authority structure (Inoguchi, 2003).

Fourth, given the increased trend toward decentralization and fragmentation behind the facade of centralized government, a new trend has been emerging. The cozy entente among central bureaucracy, the Liberal Democratic Party and big business has gone forever. When the center can not hold, people at the grassroots level of society seek new kinds of leader. They can be young and ambitious mavericks like Jun Saito, a former graduate student of political science at Yale, who won a seat in the vacuum created by Koichi Kato, former secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, who was forced out of office by scandals. They can be time-tested governors like Masayoshi Kitagawa, who clearly has an eye on the position of Prime Minister, after announcing that he would not seek a third term as Governor of Mie prefecture. They can be highly visible public figures like Yasuo Tanaka, a well-known and independent-minded novelist, who has been elected twice as Governor of the mountainous and scenic Nagano prefecture. This prefecture like many others has been in perennial budget deficit and political protagonists have split into two camps, one of which is seeking more money from the central government for public works and the other of which is seeking to develop new industries based on a new lifestyle concept. This is the camp of which Tanaka is part. Within the Liberal Democratic Party the trend is clearly for politicians and potential leaders to become more self-reliant, personally mobilizing district-level organizations by conversing with local people much more intensely. This strategy can be pursued through a variety of media, including more targeted and intensive use of the Internet and e-mail, appealing proactively to business for political donations, appealing to popular sentiment through television and media appearances, articulating a policy vision through
participation in public symposia, and, finally, through volunteer activities. (Inoguchi & Uenohara, forthcoming).

The fifth point is more directly related to global forces, as globalization also requires astute, articulate and agile leaders. The globalization of governance entails more integrated markets, the global diffusion of military weapons, and the global permeation of public elite culture as evidenced in the Davos World Economic Summit meetings (Berger/Huntington 2002). Astute, articulate and agile leaders must always be mindful of domestic audiences and yet must act globally – and decisively. Politicians must be shrewd, media literate and able to appeal to a broad cross-section of public opinion through quality of performance.

All of these developments have been influencing Japan's authority structure. Whether Japan is capable of remolding its authority structure to make it more conducive to the exercise of leadership is something one needs to consider in light of the relative weight of these factors and the alchemy derived from a combination of them. Even a casual look at Koizumi's record yields mixed results. The decisiveness of his summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Il augurs well for those who hope that Japan can become a normal state. But the difficulties he has in acting decisively on economic reform issues augurs ill.

4.2 The Use of Force

The prohibition on Japan’s use of force arose out of the project pursued by the Allied Powers during the period of Occupation (1945-1952). The aim of the Allied Powers was to disarm Japan, change the war-prone regime and reshape Japan into a peace-loving country which would not make another attempt at aggression in East and Southeast Asia, in defiance of the preferences of the West. This can be referred to as “putting the cap on the bottle” (Inoguchi, 2001). A new constitution was drafted by the still vibrant remnant of the New Deal Coalition, interested in extending their own experiment in the United States to other parts of the world, most notably in Japan and in Germany (Zunz, 2000). The drafters of the Constitution were interested in promoting freedom, democracy, free enterprise, trade unionism and gender equality. And they were interested in remolding Japan as a disarmed, agricultural and stable country in America's embrace. The bulk of the Constitution-drafting was carried out in 1946. That is why the Preamble contains a passage on an aspiration to eradicate the use of force, and Article Nine refers to the abrogation of the use of force in settling international disputes. As the Cold War intensified in the Far East, however, the United States decided not to put the cap on the bottle after all. Instead the United States wanted Japan to be a stable, peaceful but robust country which could sustain the United States’ Cold War strategy, in terms of securing military bases and ports, fuelling and repairing aircraft and warships, and supplying food and comfort. The immediate outcomes of this policy shift were as follows: (1) Japan regained its independence and (2) the Japan-United States
Security Treaty was concluded. The United States retained its military presence, while pledging to defend Japan and to act as a deterrent to countries considering aggression against Japan. In this scheme, the Constitution and the Security Treaty are complementary. The Self Defense Forces were created incrementally, initially as police reserve forces. Their function was auxiliary to the United States Armed Forces in the Far East, other than in the prosecution of the initially very important role of maintaining law and order. This was a time when Japan was recovering from defeat and dealing with alarmingly strong left-wing forces.

The Constitution prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Japan does have a number of territorial disputes with other countries in East Asia: with the Soviet Union/Russia (four southern Kurile islands); with South Korea (Takeshima/Dokdo island); and with China/Taiwan (Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands). However, the structure of the Cold War and the nature of Japan’s security relationship with the US made it effectively impossible for Japan to act unilaterally or aggressively with regard to any of these disputes. After the Cold War new contingencies have arisen which highlight the nature of this constraint on Japan’s prosecution of a normal foreign policy. United Nations operations require member states to place troops in combat situations. As a result of the constraint on the use of force, the only operations in which Japan has been involved have been post-war peace-building and peacekeeping operations (Fukushima, forthcoming). Needless to say, Japan engages its peace keeping and peace building operations only on the bases of a United Nations Security Counsel resolution. Palestine, Kosovo, Rwanda, Cambodia and East Timor are among examples of such engagement. Japan’s justification for participating at all is that even though the use of force is constitutionally forbidden, Japan’s desire to promote peace is sufficiently strong to motivate it to participate in UN operations. After all, Japan is a self-appointed global civilian power. Japan's anti-militarism has been deep-rooted for the last half a century (Berger, 1997; Katzenstein, 1993). Even in the recent past it has been common to observe that the government of the day can not expect to survive unless it moves within the parameters of prevailing anti-militarist public opinion and norms.

The Yomiuri shimbun (2002) has regularly asked the following question on Constitutional revision since 1981: “Do you think that it is better to revise the Constitution now or that it is better not to revise the Constitution?” For the last five years those in favor of Constitutional revision have constituted a majority (52.3% to 60%). Since 9/11, those favoring the despatch of Self Defense Forces for peace keeping purposes, even during periods of military conflict have constituted a majority, with 44.4% in favor and 25.8% opposed. Needless to say, motives for advocating Constitutional revision differ from one person to another. The majority answer for the last decade has been that new problems have emerged in international relations, which can not be satisfactorily addressed due to the constraints embodied in the Constitution. In parliamentary terms, the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Conservative Party and the Liberal
Party form the revisionist wing. The Komei Party argues for Constitutional revision, but places greater emphasis on other issues such as social welfare, the protection of privacy, transparency in governance and reform of the electoral system. Although revisionists are in the majority in public opinion and in both houses of the National Diet, they have not been able to make a breakthrough. First, for Constitutional revision to occur, a two-thirds majority is necessary in both houses of the National Diet. Second, prolonged economic stagnation discourages the government of the day from undertaking risky and burdensome initiatives.

Two significant new developments have complicated Japan’s pacifist orientation. One is the increasing number of cases where the United States takes military action in an often unilateralist fashion. The 9/11 events precipitated this new trend. Given the overwhelming power of the United States, and given the increased significance of failed states and rogue states in terms of their ability to disturb law and order in globalized politics, the United States defines its new mission as promoting freedom, democracy and the free market on a global scale. In its predominantly military-oriented strategy, the traditional significance of allies seems to have been diluted by an overriding need to have as many close partners as possible, who give unstinting support and credence to United States-led military action, thereby legitimating it. In the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan there were two kinds of close partners: the United Kingdom and Australia, and China and Russia. The former two partners played two key roles. One is the extraordinary ease and speed with which troops were sent. In the words of critics they were like mercenaries. The other is the articulation and legitimation of the logic behind the military strategy. Blair’s passionate and eloquent speeches are evidence of this. So is Prime Minister John Howard’s apt characterization of Australia’s role; deputy sheriff. Both the troops and the words are indispensable. Britain committed far less troops to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan than Germany, which sent 10,000 troops. But it is Britain, not Germany, which of all partners gives the greater impression of closeness to the US. China and Russia were close partners in this enterprise, because they both have domestic equivalents of Osama bin Laden, and have every reason to legitimize their own suppression of dissident groups by enthusiastically endorsing Bush’s war on terrorism.

The second development is the increasing number of cases where Japanese believe that a material breach of their sovereignty has taken place. This includes North Korea firing missiles over the Japanese archipelago in August 1998, and the case of the North Korean ship which was chased over the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zones and sunk by Japanese Coastal Guard ships in 2001. It was long suspected, but only officially admitted at the September 2002 summit talk between Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong Il, that a number of Japanese nationals had been abducted by the North Koreans. North Korean revealed details of its nuclear program to the United States two weeks after misleading Japan at the above summit meeting. Chinese ships
regularly measure the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zones, North Koreans engage in drug trafficking, and Chinese illegal immigrants commit an increasing range and number of crimes.

Japanese have become increasingly liable to conceive of such issues as an affront to their national dignity and sovereignty. Accordingly, measures have been taken to address these affronts. For instance, Japan has responded to the North Korean nuclear threat by signing an accord with the United States, accelerating the projected completion of the missile defense program. Japan has responded to North Korean ships engaged in drug trafficking, abduction, and espionage activities by upgrading the military hardware placed on coastal guard ships, and increasing general levels of vigilance. The increase in crimes committed by often illegal residents has been responded to in part by steadily raising consciousness of the need to tackle such crimes. All of the above developments have caused right-wing nationalistic groups to agitate. Populist right wing politicians have also responded. For instance, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara has called for a rhetorical war against North Korea, rather than the strategy of diplomatic normalization which is currently being pursued by the Japanese government.

One possibly new development in Japan’s peace keeping and peace building operation is its increasing emphasis on Asia. Till recently, it was usually argued that the history issue hindered Japan from sending its troops to Asia. In fact it was only in 1991 when Japan first sent its 250 strong troops to Cambodia. Then in 1999 Japan sent its largest 750 strong troops to East Timor. In 2001 onward Japan sent its large number of government and NGO personnel to Afghanistan for its reconstruction. Its recent focus on Asia has to do with three factors: (1) Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japan has faced its decrease in government revenue that can be used for foreign policy purposes. Its global civilian orientation notwithstanding, its focus on its vicinity has become compelling. (2) Its history constrains have been loosening with its neighbors becoming less vocal. South Korea and China since 1998 are most noteworthy.

4.3 The Historical Legacy

Aggression and the atrocities which Japan committed before 1945 have made it prudent for Japan to play a low key role in postwar international affairs. Japan waged war against all of the Allied Powers, and several countries which had signed the Declaration of the United Nations. It is important to recall that the position of the United States government on the issue of Japan’s historical legacy changed dramatically. This occurred when it faced the need to prop Japan up instead of placing a cap on the bottle, as China became communist and the Korean War broke out. With the end of the Cold War historical issues have once more become salient. Discussion of Japan’s historical legacy often seem to be a function of its economic success. The end of the Cold War came at a time of economic stagnation for the United States. Exploitation of the historical legacy became part of the peace dividend, encouraging some groups to express anti-Japanese
sentiment, especially in the United States. Another twist to the story of the significance of Japan’s historical legacy has occurred with Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation in the 1990s, during which time historical issues have once again become less salient.

In Japan, it is felt that the righting of wrongs has been overdone, and that there have been more than enough apologies for the war. These twin sentiments have gained increased support in the last two decades. It is only in the last five years or so, however, that it has been possible for these sentiments to materialize in concrete fashion (Inoguchi, 2002b). In 1998 the Japanese-Korean joint communique recorded what was regarded as a full apology for colonialism and military aggression on the Japanese side, and a future-oriented posture about the bilateral relationship on the Korean side. Later in 1998 the Japanese-Chinese joint communique did not register as comprehensive an expression of Japanese repentence for aggression as China wanted. Yet associated agreements on Japanese official development assistance to China were not jeopardized because of this. More recently, each time Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has visited the Yasukuni shrine where the Japanese war dead, including war criminals, are buried, both Korea and China registered moderate protest. But neither went very far in attempt to halt this activity. In January 2003 Prime Minister Koizumi paid a visit to the shrine, and in response President Kim Dae Joon cancelled a planned meeting with Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. But President-elect Roh Moo Hyong did meet her, and registered a protest, but went on to have substantial talks on other matters with her. The Chinese government did suspend some expendable high level meetings as a diplomatic gesture, but on the whole it did not register a strong protest. At home, in 2001 the Ministry of Education approved what is regarded as a right wing history textbook for junior high schools, for the first time. Five other approved textbooks of history are regarded as center-right or centrist or center-left. But it should be stressed that only slightly more than .03 percent of Japanese junior high schools adopted this right wing textbook. I suggest that this fact demonstrates the existence of a resilient anti-militarism.

Indeed, by the turn of the new century, critical references to the Japanese historical legacy have become more intermittent and less strident. This is not to say that there has been no criticism. However, it is undeniable that the historical legacy has become less of an issue. South Korea under President Kim Dae Jung has taken initiatives to consolidate its ties with Japan, ties which are qualitatively differently from what has gone before. In 1998 Kim Dae Jung and Keizo Obuchi issued a joint communique announcing a new era for this important bilateral relationship. Jiang Zemin’s China was very pragmatic but at times rhetorically vehement about Japan’s ambivalent attitude towards its historical legacy, as exemplified in his speeches during his visit to Japan in 1998. China under Hu Jingtao seems set to take a course much milder than that pursued under Jiang Zeming. This has been suggested in a journal article authored by Ma Licheng, which calls for a new strengthened relationship with Japan, which regards the Chinese accusation of
Japan for its historical legacy, the Taiwan issue or Japan's militarist revival as harmful (Ma, 2002).

Firstly, the passage of time is an important issue, and on this view the Second World War will soon be a thing of the past to many people. Secondly, Japan's neighbors, the United States, China and South Korea, now have much more economic self-confidence vis-à-vis Japan. Recent travails notwithstanding, the United States remains proud of its new economy. China talks of 7% annual growth rates for the next two decades. South Korea has recovered from the nadir of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, registering some 5-6% annual growth. Thirdly, the United States has become the only superpower, or even hyperpower, and has often flexed its muscles unilaterally. In order to reduce the possible negative impacts of the new Pax Americana, many countries in the rest of the world have attempted to forge larger regional groupings, as in the case of the EU, and ASEAN plus Three.

At home, those who have personal experience of Japan’s historical legacy have significantly reduced in number. Yet anti-militarism remains strong. I have already mentioned the latest version of the textbook controversy. Furthermore, each time the issue of the use of force has been discussed, the Japanese government has decided not to violate basic anti-militarist norms. In the Gulf War of 1991, Japan sent minesweepers to do the job only after the war was over. With regard to peacekeeping operations since the UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) in Cambodia in 1991, Japan has participated in non-military activities only. Japan sent large numbers of troops to East Timor, but only after a cease-fire was realized. Japan contributed to the war on terror in Afghanistan by sending warships to the Indian Ocean to detect and monitor ships and submarines operating in the region, and to provide gasoline for American and British aircraft. Anticipating the vacuum to be created by the United States’ entry into an anti-Iraq war in 2003, Japan sent an Aegis-equipped warship to detect and destroy missiles aimed at warships operating there. Japan's deployment of an Aegis-equipped warship in the Indian Ocean is the first instance where Japan has taken the risk of war casualties in its anti-militarist postwar history. Therefore it is safe to say that Japan has not forgotten about history, but it has modified its behavior. It now acts as a responsible global civilian power, committed to the causes of anti-terrorism and peace-building within the constitutional and institutional framework entrenched in the Japanese Constitution since the occupation.

5. Conclusion
Having examined Japan's ambition for normal statehood in the preceding pages, let me speculate what all this will add up to. It is helpful to consider the following two contingencies:

(1) North Korea going decisively and demonstratively nuclear:
What would Japan do if North Korea officially became a nuclear-weapon state? Would Japan go nuclear? My answer is probably not, unless some dramatically different situation were to arise (cf. Kamiya, 2002). If Japan goes nuclear in response to developments in North Korea, this would be a source of concern for China, which has historically tended to regard North Korea as a useful buffer state. Should North Korea be threatened by Japan, China would start to view Japan in a more hostile light. Such was the case in 1931 when Japan's Kwantung Army crossed the Yalujiang (Amnokkang) into Manchuria (Ogata, 1964). Such was also the case in 1951 when the United Nations forces came close to the Yalujiang and bombed Shenyang and other cities in China's Northeast, when China intervened in the Korean War (Whiting, 1960). You might ask why Japan should be so concerned what China thinks. The answer is that a stable relationship with China has been a sine qua non for Japan's prosperity. Some distance is advisable but a mutually hostile relationship is clearly in neither Japan's nor China's interests. Japan should be careful that any nuclear strategy it might adopt could not be construed as hostile by Beijing. That would be difficult and potentially suicidal. No less important to consider is the preference of the United States. Senator John McCain's and others' view favoring to consider Japan being allowed to go nuclear by the United States notwithstanding, the United States government is most likely to continue steadfastly its policy of nuclear nonproliferation, strictly applies to Japan as well. Otherwise Northeast Asia would be thrown into the domino of nuclear proliferation like the one that took place in South Asia in 2002, a scenario the United States is determined to suppress. Nevertheless, the voices arguing for the use of force for self defense have been expressed at the higher level, as well as among the public at large. Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba expressed on February 13, 2003 “Our nation will use military force as a self defense measure if [North Korea] starts to resort to arms against Japan.”

What the Japanese government has undertaken to cope with the nuclear threat from North Korea is limited, however. First, the increased reliance on the United States, which has been assuring that the Iraqi crisis will not dilute its commitment in Northeast Asia. Second, it has been enhanced its commitment to develop missile defense with United States in an accelerated fashion. Thirds, it has decided to deploy more Aegis-equipped warships. Forth, it has heightened vigilance.

What should Japan do if China becomes its most important trading partner? A potentially worrisome trend is already emerging. From 2000 onwards, during the process of recovery from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Korea has been stepping up its economic interactions with
China, in terms of both trade and foreign direct investment. By 2002, Korea's biggest trading partner was already China, with Japan a close second, and the United States a distant third. In a similar vein, Japan's export drive to China has mitigated some of the negative side effects of economic stagnation.

In December 2002 the Mainichishimbun (2003) asked the following question: Do you want to maintain the Japan-United States Treaty? Or do you want to transform it into a Peace and Friendship Treaty? Or do you want to abrogate the Japan-United States Security Treaty? The percentage of respondents giving positive answers to each of the three options were, respectively: 37 percent, 33 percent and 4 percent. Japan's export drive to China, which has been quite robust, especially in materials and machinery, is contributing to this unexpected rise in the number of people answering the second option in the affirmative. Another explanatory factor is the steady increase in negative sentiment about American unilateralism. Anti-Americanism is universal in anticipation of an American attack against Iraq (Pew Research Center, 2002). Japan's anti-Americanism undisputedly registered a lower-than-global average, underlining the prudence and self-restraints on the part of many Japanese. It may not be a coincidence that a steady rise in the China trade both in Korea and in Japan goes hand in hand with a rise in the kind of public opinion which bandwagons the cure of the China market or, to exaggerate Finlandizes itself in anticipation of the possibly irreversible trend of China's rise.

Since the second option implies the absence of United States military forces from Japan, the increased popularity of this second option could indicate a trend that needs careful attention. But a rise in pro-Chinese public opinion does not necessarily have profound implications for Japan's security arrangements. Japan has a significant stake in the global economy, and given the basic lack of shared norms and values between Japan and China, it would be very difficult to argue that Japan would move substantially towards a pro-China position, because this would dilute and possibly unravel its institutional arrangements with and ties to the United States.

To sum up, Japan's ambition for normal statehood will not trigger a dramatic systemic change as long as these aspirations are anchored in its security alliance with the United States, on the basis of shared norms and values as well as on trust that is to be intermittently demonstrated as they, together with others, manage risks and difficulties that lie ahead. But Japan should also keep in mind Deng Xiaoping's warning that if Japan and China go to war, then at least half of heaven collapses. Japan's ambition for normal statement in terms of its authority structure, its use of force and its historical legacy will be best managed on the basis of this line of thinking.

In discussing Japan's ambitions for normal statehood, I might have exaggerated the limitations and slighted its accomplishments. As a matter of fact, Japan has accomplished a lot in an environment where there was a wide consensus and whose changes tended to be slow. In
1945 Japan registered the lowest per capital with level in Asia, with the Philippines registered the highest. In 2003 Japan is among the top ranking wealthiest nations. It is very impressive. In 1945 the Japanese Imperial Army was disarmed completely. In 2003 the Japanese Self Defense Force is of the No.2 size in terms of budget and weapons. It is all the more impressive because Japan has build up its military power slowly but exorably without alienating the United States.

To sum it all, Japan has won peace throughout its post-1945 history, with no one killed in combat. It is impressive indeed. Whether Japan with yearning for normal statehood increasingly visible is able to navigate in the terra incognita of the new Pax Americana is yet to be watched.
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